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What is the effect of the combined direct and indirect social influences—peer pressure 
(PP)—on a social group’s collective decisions? We present a model that captures PP as a 
function of the socio-cultural distance between individuals in a social group. Using this 
model and empirical data from 15 real-world social networks we found that the PP level 
determines how fast a social group reaches consensus. More importantly, the levels of PP 
determine the leaders who can achieve full control of their social groups. PP can overcome 
barriers imposed upon a consensus by the existence of tightly connected communities with 
local leaders or the existence of leaders with poor cohesiveness of opinions. A moderate level 
of PP is also necessary to explain the rate at which innovations diffuse through a variety of 
social groups. 
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The social group’s pressure on an individual—peer pressure (PP)—has attracted the 
attention of scholars in a variety of disciplines, spanning sociology, economics, finance, 
psychology, and management sciences
1–4
. In analyzing PP we should consider not only 
those individuals directly linked to a particular person, but also those who exert indirect 
social influence over other persons as well
5–8
. Although PP is an elusive concept, it can 
be considered a decreasing function of a given individual’s socio-cultural distance from 
the group. Thus, an individual’s opinion may be influenced more strongly by the pressure 
exerted by those socio-culturally closer to her. Consensus is well documented across the 
social sciences, with examples ranging from behavioral flocking in popular cultural 
styles, emotional contagion, collective decision making, pedestrians’ walking behavior, 
and others
9-12
.  
We can model consensus in a social group by encoding the state of each individual 
at a given time t  in a vector  tu . The group reaches consensus at t   when 
    0i ju t u t   for every pair of individuals, and the collective dynamics of the 
system is modeled by  
 
 
d t
t
dt
 
u
Lu ,   00 uu  ,                                             (1) 
where L  is a linear operator (Laplacian matrix) capturing the topology of the social 
network
9
.  
Decisions in groups trying to reach consensus are frequently influenced by a small 
proportion of the group who guides or dictates the behavior of the entire network. In this 
situation a group of leaders indicates and/or initiates the route to the consensus, and the 
rest of the group readily follows their attitudes. The study of leadership in social groups 
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has always intrigued researchers in the social and behavioral sciences
13–17
. Specifically, 
the way in which leaders emerge in social groups is not well understood
18
. Leaders may 
emerge either randomly in response to particular historical circumstances or from the 
individual having the most prominent position (centrality) in the social network at any 
time.  
 
Results 
Emergence of leaders and PP. To capture the influence of PP over the emergence of 
leaders in social groups, we consider that the pressure that an individual p  receives from 
q  deteriorates proportionally with the social distance between p  and q . The social 
distance is captured by the number of links in the shortest path connecting p  and q . 
Mathematically, we model the mobilizing power between two individuals at distance d  
as   1~  dfd , where  df  represents a function of the social distance (see Methods 
equations (11) and (12)). The collective dynamics of the network under peers’ mobilizing 
effects is described by the following generalization of the consensus model 
   t
dt
td
d
d
d uL
u








  ,   00 uu  ,                                           (2) 
where dL  captures the interactions between individuals separated by d  links in their 
social network, 
dd /1~  where the parameter   accounts for the strength of the PP 
pulling an individual into the consensus.  
We now compare the hypotheses about the random emergence of good leaders—
those who significantly reduce the time for reaching consensus in a network—to those in 
which leaders emerge from the most central individuals. Let us examine the emergence of 
  
3 
 
leadership from five centrality criteria: degree, eigenvector, closeness, betweenness, and 
subgraph (see Supplementary Information equations (S1)-(S5)). In general, we observe 
that the leaders emerging from the most central individuals are better in leading the 
consensus than those emerging randomly. However, when there is certain level of PP 
over the actors, the situation changes dramatically (Fig. 1a, b). First, the time to reach 
consensus significantly decreases to less than 20% of the time needed when no PP exists. 
Second, a leader emerging randomly in the network could be as good as one emerging 
from the most central actors when PP exists in the system. Due to the recent results about 
the role of low-degree nodes in controlling complex networks
19
 we have also tested the 
role of PP over these potential drivers. Our results show again that good leaders emerge 
regardless of their centrality in the network when PP exists in the system (Supplementary 
Information). In other words, under the appropriate PP any individual in a social group 
could emerge as a good leader independently of her position in the network. This result 
adds a new dimension to the problem of network controllability
19–22 
by demonstrating 
that PP is a major driving force in determining how potential controllers can emerge in 
the network independently of their centrality (Supplementary Fig. S1) and — in contrast 
with previous results
19, 23, 24
 — of the degree distribution of the network (Supplementary 
Fig. S2). 
a b 
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Figure 1 | Random and centrality-based emergence of leaders. The emergence of 
leaders is analyzed according to randomness (Rnd), betweenness (BC), closeness (CC), 
degree (DC), eigenvector (EC), and subgraph (SC) centrality. The peer pressure is 
modeled by 
dd /1~ , with   equal to 5.1  and 0.2 . The third line corresponds to 
no peer pressure. (a) Communication network among workers in a sawmill. (b) Elite 
corporate directors. (c) Friendship network of injected drug users in Colorado Springs. 
(d) Random network having communities.  
 
In roughly half of the 15 social networks studied (Supplementary Information) we 
observe the following anomalous pattern. Leaders randomly emerging in the network are 
better in leading the consensus than some emerging from the most central individuals 
(see Fig. 1c). This situation appears when the network has the leaders distributed through 
diverse communities in the network. A community is a group of individuals who are more 
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tightly connected among themselves than with the other actors in the network
25
. Actors in 
one of these communities reach consensus among themselves easily, but it is difficult to 
reach consensus between different communities. Most central actors in such networks are 
frequently located in a single community. When they emerge as leaders, they drive 
consensus only in their community but not in the global network. In contrast, when 
leaders emerge randomly, they more likely emerge simultaneously in different 
communities, a situation that favors global agreement in the network. Constructing a 
random network with communities as illustrated in Fig. 1 (bottom right) corroborates this 
hypothesis (Supplementary Tables S6 and S7). These results suggest the necessity of 
considering community leaders in social networks as effective mobilizers of actors 
throughout the network. We have observed that the leaders emerging on the basis of their 
community positions exhibit greater success in reaching consensus than those randomly 
emerging in the network. However, when appropriate PP exists, leaders who effectively 
reach consensus emerge regardless of their position in their communities.  
The leaders in a social group do not always exhibit a high level of cohesiveness. 
We posit that the leaders’ capacity to lead the consensus in a network depends on their 
divergence of opinions. A cohesive group of leaders can more effectively lead the social 
group than leaders with larger divergences among their opinions. To model leader 
cohesiveness we introduce the divergence parameter L , which is the circumradius of 
the regular polygon comprising all the leaders. 0L  indicates a very cohesive group of 
leaders. We now examine the influence of the leaders’ cohesiveness on consensus. Figure 
2 illustrates the results for the friendship network of workers in the sawmill with either no 
PP (left plots) or with PP modeled by 
2/1~ dd  (right plots). The values of leader 
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divergence range from 0.0 to 0.2. The lack of leader cohesiveness significantly increases 
the time to consensus when there is no PP. In fact, the time increases more than 33% 
when the divergence changes from 0.0 to 0.2 (it grows to 80.2% for 5.0L , see 
Supplementary Fig. S3 and S4 and Supplementary Tables S1, S3-S5). In addition, the 
cohesiveness of the group—measured by the standard deviation at consensus G —is 
very poor for large values of L  ( 6.154G , 183.6, and 226.9 for 0.0L , 0.1, and 
0.2, respectively), which indicates highly heterogeneous group opinions. However, when 
PP exists, the situation dramatically changes. First, the time to consensus does not 
increase as drastically with the decrease of leader cohesiveness. Second, group 
cohesiveness at the consensus is very high even for the lowest leader cohesiveness (
0.27G , 35.4, and 33.0, for 0.0L , 0.1, and 0.2, respectively). In short, when PP is 
absent, leader cohesiveness plays a fundamental role in the time needed to reach 
consensus and in group cohesiveness at the consensus. When PP is present, the time 
needed to reach consensus and group cohesiveness are largely independent of the degree 
of divergence in the leaders’ opinions, and the consensus is driven primarily by the 
influence of the nearest neighbors and PP.  
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Figure 2 | Leaders’ cohesiveness and consensus. Analysis of the influence of leaders 
cohesiveness on the time to reach consensus in the communication network among 
workers in the sawmill without (left plots) and with (right plots) PP. The leaders’ 
divergences used are: 0.0 (top), 0.1 (middle), and 0.2 (bottom). The time to reach 
consensus (in blue) relative to a total time of 1,500 units (Insets). 
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Diffusion of innovations and PP. Another area that has received great research attention 
is the diffusion of innovations
26–29
. The diffusion of innovations refers to the process 
through which new ideas and practices spread within and between social groups. Here we 
consider the hypothesis that PP plays a fundamental role in innovation adoption or 
rejection. To test our hypothesis, we study two datasets in which diffusion of innovations 
was followed for different periods of time (Supplementary Information). The first study 
analyzed the diffusion of a modern mathematic method among the primary and secondary 
schools in Allegheny County (Pennsylvania, USA). Results revealed that innovation 
diffused through the friendship network of the superintendents of the schools involved. 
The study was followed for a period of six years, 1958–1963. The second dataset 
represents the second phase of a longitudinal study about how Brazilian farmers adopted 
the use of hybrid seed corns, examining personal factors influencing farmers’ innovative 
behavior in agriculture. We consider here the social network of friendship ties and the 
cumulative number of adopters of the new technology in three different communities of 
the Brazilian farmers study (Supplementary Fig. S5). The study was conducted over the 
course of 20 years and we consider only the individuals in the largest connected 
components of the networks. 
Figure 3 depicts the number of actors that adopted the respective innovations at 
different times. These values correspond to the number of adopters observed empirically 
in field studies. To simulate the process of innovation adoption, we study the consensus 
dynamics with equation (2), assuming 
dd /1~ : no PP, moderate PP (
0.50.6   ), high PP ( 0.30.4   ) (see Supplementary Information). The 
simulations follow perfect sigmoid curves, as Fig. 3 illustrates. Observe that when there 
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is no PP effect, the diffusion curves predict slower rates of adoption than those 
empirically observed. For example, the empirical evidence demonstrates that 50% of 
schools adopted the new math method in roughly three years, whereas the simulation 
without PP predicts a period of four years of a total of six years. In the case of the 
Brazilian farmers, the empirical time for 50% of the farmers to adopt the innovation is 
roughly 12 years, whereas the simulation without PP predicts 16 years of a total of 20 
years. When the model uses strong PP, the diffusion curves display very rapid adoption 
rates, which are far from the reality of the empirical evidence in both cases. However, 
using a moderate PP predicts very well the outputs of the empirical results in both 
studies. These PP values are found by a reverse engineering method, but the important 
message is that a certain PP level is necessary to describe the empirical evidence on the 
diffusion of innovations in social groups (see also Supplementary Information).  
These results demonstrate that interpersonal communication alone cannot 
sufficiently explain the process of innovation adoption in a social group. The pressure 
exerted by the social group plays a fundamental role in shaping this important social 
phenomenon. Our model describes effectively PP’s role in these and other important 
phenomena, consistent with our intuition and with the existing empirical evidence.  
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a b 
  
 
Figure 3 | Diffusion of innovations under PP. (a) Adopters of a new mathematical 
method among US colleges in a period of 6 years. (b) Adopters of the use of hybrid seed 
corns among Brazilian farmers for a period of 20 years. Experimental values are given as 
stars and the simulation with no (broken red line), moderate (continuous blue line) and 
strong (dotted green line) PP are illustrated. 
 
 
Methods 
Consensus dynamics model. We consider a social group of n actors who will 
accomplish a certain goal or reach an agreement. Every actor in the group is represented 
by an element of the node set  nV ,...,1  of a network ),( EVG  , in which links 
(edges) }{ VVE   represent the relationships (friendship, any form of communication) 
among the actors. The set of neighbors of the actor i is denoted by 
 EjiVjN
i
 ),(: . Let nn
ji
Ra  ][A  and nn
ji
RlG  ][)(L
 
be the adjacency 
matrix and Laplacian matrix, respectively, associated with graph G. The Laplacian matrix 
is defined as AKL  , where K is the diagonal matrix of node degrees of G and A  is 
the adjacency matrix. 
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The information states of the actors evolve according to the single-integrator 
dynamics given by 
i
i g
dt
tdu

)(
, i = 1,..., n, and ii zu )0( ,                        
(3) 
where Ru
i
  is the information state at time t, Rg
i
  is the information control input, 
and Rz
i
  is the initial state of actor i, which is always considered to be selected at 
random. A continuous time consensus algorithm is given by 



iNj
ijiji nitutuag ,,...,1)),()((      (4) 
where 
ij
a  is the ),( ji entry of the adjacency matrix A. The information state of each 
actor is driven toward those of her neighbors. Equations (3) and (4) describe the 
collective dynamics of the social group and can be written in matrix form as 
,
)(
Lu
u

dt
td
      (5) 
where  T
n
uu ,...,
1
u is the vector of the states of the actors in the system. The consensus 
among the actors is achieved if, for all )(tu
i
 and all nji ,...,1,  , 0)()(  tutu
ji
 as 
. 
When the interaction among agents occurs at a discrete time, the information state 
is updated using a difference equation, and a discrete time consensus algorithm is then 
given by 
 
,,...,1)),()(()()1( nitutuatutu
j
ijijii
      (6) 
t
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where 
ij
a  is as before and   is the time step. The information state of each actor is 
updated as the weighted average of her current state and those of her neighbors. Equation 
(6) is written in matrix form as 
 
).()1( tt Puu       (7) 
The matrix P is known as the Perron matrix, which is obtained as LIP  , for 
max
10

  , where κmax is the maximum of the degrees of the nodes of G. The entries 
of the Perron matrix satisfy the property  
j
ij
p 1 with jipij ,,0  , and hence, it is a 
valid transition matrix
9
.  
  
Consensus with leaders–followers. We consider that there exist one or multiple leaders 
who guide the entire group to the consensus through the effect produced by the rest of the 
group, which follows them
30
. In a leaders–followers structure with a single leader, actors 
attempt to reach an agreement that is biased to the state of the leader, whereas in the case 
of multiple (stationary) leaders, all followers converge to the convex hull formed by the 
leaders’ states.  
An actor is called a stationary leader if her opinion is available for the other actors 
but is not modified during the process. Then, the set of all actors can be divided into two 
subgroups: leaders and followers. As a result, the vector of the states of all actors can also 
be divided into two parts: the states of leaders, ul, and the states of followers, uf.  
For a system with multiple stationary leaders, all the nodes can be labeled such that 
the first nf represents the followers and the remaining nl represent the leaders. The total 
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number of actors in the system is n = nf + nl, such that the Laplacian matrix associated 
with the social network G is partitioned as 
 







l
T
fl
flf
G
Ll
lL
L )( ,
  
    (8) 
 
where ll
ff nn
l
nn
f RR
  LL  , , and . 
Because the leaders are stationary, their dynamics are given by nnitu
fi
,..,1,0)(  . 
Then, the dynamics of the system are expressed by 
 


















l
fflf
p
l
f
u
u
00
lL
uL
u
u


.     (9) 
 
The discrete version of equation (9) is given by 
 
)()()1( tt
pn
uLIu  ,     (10) 
where  T
n
tutut )(),...,()(
1
u , 
n
I  is the identity matrix of size nn , and 
p
L  is the 
Laplacian matrix of network G, with each entry of the jth row equal to zero for
.  
 
Modeling peer pressure. The consensus dynamic modeling assumes that the actors only 
interact with their directly connected neighbors to cooperatively achieve an agreement in 
the system
31
. However, in many real-world situations, the actors are exposed not only to 
lf nn
fl
R

l
nnj
f
,...,1
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their closest contacts but also to individuals who are socio-culturally close to them 
despite not being directly connected. For instance, this situation appears in actors’ 
attitudes toward copying others. The predisposition of an actor to copy a behavior 
depends not only on her friends’ adoption of such behavior but also on other, socio-
culturally close people having a positive predisposition to that behavior. For instance, 
adolescents adopt “binge drinking” not only by copying their mates but also by observing 
similar behavior among others of a similar age, education, and social class. Then, we 
argue that this socio-cultural distance can be captured in a model by considering the 
shortest path distance between two actors in their social group. The shortest path distance 
is the number of steps in the shortest path connecting the two actors. The influence that 
an actor receives/produces from/for others in her social network, i.e., peer pressure, 
decays as a function of this socio-cultural distance, which separates the two actors
32
. 
 
Peer pressure can then be modeled by considering the generalized Laplacian 
matrix
33
. Consequently, the consensus dynamics model of equation (6) can be written as 
 
   )()1( tt
d
ddn
uLIu   ,    (11) 
 
where 
d
dd
L  involves the d-Laplacian matrices and the coefficients 
d
  indicate the 
strength of the interactions at distance )(
max
Gdd  , with )(
max
Gd  being the maximum 
distance between two nodes or the diameter of graph G. The d-Laplacian matrix is 
defined as
33
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







otherwise
ji
dd
ijiL
ij
dd
0
)(
1
),(  ,       (12) 
 
where the expression )(i
d
  is the d-path degree of node i defined as the number of non-
redundant shortest paths of length d having i as an endpoint. 
The coefficients 
d
  should account for the decay in peer pressure for the socio-
cultural distance between the actors of   1~  df
d
, where  df  represents a function of 
distance d. In this study, we consider three different decay behaviors described by the 
following equations:  
1) Power-law decay: 
,
 
2) Exponential decay: 
, and
 
3) Social interactions: , 
where α, β, and δ are parameters to be adjusted to consider the different strengths of peer 
pressure.  
 
 
   
 d
d
d
d
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Supplementary Methods and Discussion 
 
Emergence of leaders. We consider two possible scenarios that describe the manner in 
which leaders emerge in a social group: 
 
1) Emerging randomly from the social group, and 
2) Emerging from the most central individuals in the social group.  
The centrality of an actor in her social group can be considered in several ways. The 
concept of actor centrality is related to the question “Which are the most important or 
central nodes in a network?” We study five centrality measures defined in25 to consider 
potential leaders from among the actors in specific respective social groups. The 
centrality measures considered are as follows: 
 
i) Degree centrality (DC): This measure is considered the simplest in a network 
defined as the number of edges connected to a node. It has been used 
assuming that nodes with connections to many other nodes might have more 
influence or access to information than those with few connections. 
The degree of a node can be expressed in a matrix as 
 
 
ii
)(A1 ,      (S1) 
 
where 1 is a column vector of ones and A is the adjacency matrix of the 
network. 
ii) Eigenvector centrality (EC): This measure appears as an extension of the 
degree of centrality. Eigenvector centrality is based on the question that not all 
neighbors are equivalent because, in some cases, the importance of a node is 
related to (and increased by) its neighbors, which may themselves be 
important. Thus, instead of giving only one point for each neighbor, this 
measure gives each node a score proportional to the sum of its neighbor’s 
scores.   
The eigenvector centrality of node   is given by the  th entry of the principal 
eigenvector of the adjacency matrix 
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iii) Closeness centrality (CC): This index measures the inverse of the mean 
distance from a node to other nodes and characterizes the nodes according to 
their distance to all other nodes in the network. The closeness is defined as 
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where 


)(
),()(
GVv
vudus is the distance sum of node u.  
iv) Betweenness centrality (BC): This concept measures the extent to which a 
node lies on paths between other nodes. The nodes with high betweenness 
centrality may have considerable influence within a network because of their 
control over information passing through them. 
The index can be defined as 
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where ),( ji  is the number of shortest paths from node i to j, and ),,( jki  is 
the number of these shortest paths that pass through node k.  
v) Subgraph centrality (SC): This measure is based on the notion that the 
importance of a node can be characterized by considering its participation in 
all closed walks for which it is the starting point. 
Subgraph centrality has been defined as 
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Due to recent discoveries
19
 about the role of nodes with low degree as controllers or 
drivers in complex networks we have also studied the role of PP when the leaders emerge 
from nodes with high, medium and low degree. In the Supplementary Figure S1 we 
illustrate the results for two social networks which show that the effect of PP over the 
emergence of leaders is independent of the status of the nodes in their complex networks. 
In addition we display in Supplementary Figure S2 the cumulative degree distributions 
for all the social networks studied here. Our results resumed in Supplementary Tables 
S12-S39 show that the effect of PP is also independent of the degree distribution of the 
networks. 
 
Divergence of leaders’ opinions. We consider that leaders’ opinions may differ from the 
group’s average opinion. We call this difference the divergence L , which is represented 
by the circumradius of the regular polygon (for a two-dimensional case) that covers all 
opinions of the leaders (see Supplementary Fig. S3). If the concerned problem is 
multidimensional, that is, if we are considering more than two opinions in the system, 
then the divergence is the circumradius of a hypersphere that covers the opinion of all 
leaders. 
We applied our model to two simple undirected random graphs and 15 real social 
networks described in the Dataset summary. We allowed for every actor to have two 
opinions that were considered independent from each other, enabling a two-dimensional 
decoupled consensus process. The initial states of the followers were randomly assigned 
for every process with values in the range (0, 1). We consider that only six leaders 
emerge, either randomly or from among the most central actors, who are determined 
according to their centralities values. Their initial positions were assigned to have 
  
23 
 
divergences of 0.1 and 0.2 from the average consensus. The consensus dynamics stop 
when the difference between two consecutive measures of disagreement is less than or 
equal to 1e − 07. We simulate consensus processes with and without PP. The normalized 
values of every network are reported in Supplementary Tables S12–S39. Every value is 
the average of 50 realizations. 
To test the effects of the divergence in the system dynamics, we used the social 
network Sawmill and simulated a consensus process that allowed for different PP 
intensities. We increased the value of divergence on leaders’ opinions from zero to a 
maximum of 0.5. We indicate the consensus times for all divergence values on 
Supplementary Tables S2–S5. For the case of randomly selected leaders, times increased 
along with divergence from 13.18% to 80.24% (see Supplementary Table S1). 
We highlight that PP influenced the trajectories of followers’ opinions, precisely 
directing them toward the consensus space. At the consensus point, the final positions 
were more cohesive (Supplementary Fig. S4), indicating more homogeneous final 
opinions in the system. 
 
Networks with communities. We discovered (see main text) that when leaders are 
spread among different tightly connected communities, “anomalous” patterns are 
observed in their emergence. This “anomaly” lies in the fact that leaders emerging 
randomly in the network are more efficient in reaching consensus than those emerging 
from among the most central actors. We tested this hypothesis by constructing random 
networks in which we control the number of communities as well as the connectivity 
within and among each community. These random networks with communities 
comprised simple, undirected random graphs with 500 nodes and 10 communities 
generated using the benchmarks for community detection in
34
 coded in the C 
programming language.  
First, we selected 10 leaders randomly and by the global highest centralities and 
recorded the average time for consensus of 50 realizations. We allowed for the 
emergence of 10 leaders by the local (community-based) highest centrality, i.e., one 
leader in each community corresponding to the one with the highest centrality. When the 
leaders emerged from the global highest centralities, we observed the previously 
described anomalous behavior. This situation was modified when the leaders emerged 
from the community-based centrality. In this case, the leaders emerging from the most 
central local leaders were significantly better at reaching consensus than those emerging 
randomly (see Supplementary Tables S6 and S7).  
 
Diffusion of innovations. The essence of the diffusion process is the information 
exchange by which one individual communicates a new idea to one or several others; 
thus, diffusion is a special type of communication concerned with the spread of messages 
perceived as new. In its most elementary form, the main elements in the diffusion process 
are
26
:  
 
1) An innovation (message or information); 
2) Communication channels, through which messages are conveyed from one 
individual to another; 
3) Time of diffusion; and 
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4) The social system through which the process occurs—a set of interrelated units 
engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. The members or 
units of a social system may be individuals, informal groups, organizations, 
and/or subsystems. All members cooperate at least to the extent of seeking to 
solve a common problem. This common objective binds the system. 
Most innovations have a sigmoid-shaped (S-shaped) rate of adoption. The slope of 
the curve varies with every innovation. Certain new ideas diffuse relatively rapidly, and 
its S-curve is quite steep. Other innovations may have a slower rate of adoption, reflected 
by a more gradual S-curve. This behavior indicates the rate of adoption, i.e., the number 
of adopters of the new idea throughout time. The behavior of the adopters builds the form 
of the innovation process as follows
26
: Initially, few individuals adopt the innovation in 
each period; these are the innovators. Soon, the diffusion curve begins climbing as an 
increasing number of individuals adopt. Then, the trajectory of the rate of adoptions 
begins to level off, as fewer individuals remain who have not yet adopted. Finally, the S-
curve reaches its asymptote and the diffusion process is complete. 
Most individuals do not evaluate an innovation on the basis of scientific studies 
regarding its consequences; most people primarily depend on a subjective evaluation 
from individuals such as themselves who previously adopted the innovation, i.e., a 
dependency on the communicated experience of near peers.  
In diffusion networks, certain individuals play different roles in a social system, 
and these roles affect diffusion. Certain members of the system function as opinion 
leaders: individuals who can influence others, and who are often identified and used to 
assure better diffusion of the information. 
To analyze the impact of PP on the diffusion of innovations process, we used three 
networks from two empirical studies: 
1) The network from the study Mathematical Method35: This innovation concerns 
the diffusion of a new mathematics method in the late 1950s. It was instigated by 
top mathematicians and sponsored by the U.S. National Science Foundation and 
the U.S. Department of Education. The diffusion process was successful because 
most schools adopted the new method. The example traces the diffusion of the 
modern mathematical method among school systems that combine elementary 
and secondary programs in Allegheny County (Pennsylvania, U.S.). All school 
superintendents who were in office for at least two years were interviewed.  
Among other things, the superintendents were asked to indicate their friendship 
ties with other superintendents in the county through the following question: 
Among the chief school administrators in Allegheny County, who are your three 
best friends? 
The researcher analyzed the friendship choices among superintendents who 
adopted the method and who were in office for at least one year before the first 
adoption, indicating that they could have adopted earlier. Unfortunately, the 
researcher did not include the friendship choices by superintendents who did not 
receive any choices themselves. 
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In our study, the network represents the friendship ties among the 30 
superintendents who were part of the connected component, and the times for 
adoption represent the year in which the adopter chose the new mathematical 
method: 1-1958, 2-1959, 3-1960, 4-1961, 5-1962, and 6-1963. 
2) Three networks from the study Brazilian Farmers36: “Diffusion and Adoption of 
Innovations in Rural Societies, 1952–1973,” was a longitudinal study on how 
Brazilian farmers (BF) adopted hybrid seed corns. The study was part of a 
broader, three-phase research project concerned with the spread of modern 
technology in Brazil, Nigeria, and India.  
The data files reflect the second phase, which examined personal factors 
influencing farmers’ innovative agricultural behavior. Villages were selected from 
the total sample of Phase II villages. The groups of people were divided into 
different communities according to different variables, and the social networks of 
friends among the people in each community were retrieved. 
The data used for our study includes the social network of friendship ties and the 
cumulative number of adopters of the new technology over 20 years among the 
individuals in the giant connected component for three different communities of 
the study, identified as communities 23, 70, and 71
37
. 
We applied our consensus model to these networks, and the average consensus time 
of 50 realizations was divided into six intervals for the Mathematical Method and 20 
intervals for the BF networks. We counted the number of actors or nodes corresponding 
to the average consensus at every time step by measuring the difference between a node’s 
position and the average consensus. When the absolute value of this difference was less 
than or equal to 0.04, we considered the node to be in agreement. This process was 
conducted with and without PP by considering a power-law decay. 
The cumulative average of nodes in agreement at every interval is shown in 
Supplementary Tables S8–S11 for every network. In addition, the empirical cumulative 
number of adopters is indicated. We vary the values of parameter α to obtain behaviors 
that more effectively follow the empirical patterns. We divided these values into two 
classes: moderate PP ( 0.50.6   ) and high PP ( 0.30.4   ). Supplementary 
Figure S5 illustrates the curves of the diffusion processes that indicate that all results 
have sigmoid-like behavior that varies according to the PP in the system. 
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Supplementary Dataset Summary 
Name n Description (23) 
ER 150 
Simple undirected random graph generated from the 
Erdös–Rényi model implemented in the toolbox 
CONTEST (Taylor and Higham, 2008). 
BA 150 
Simple undirected random graph generated from the 
preferential attachment model implemented in the toolbox 
CONTEST (Taylor and Higham, 2008). 
Prison 67 
Social network of prison inmates who chose “Which 
fellows on the tier are you closest friends with?” 
(MacRae, 1960) 
Dolphins 62 
An undirected social network of frequent associations 
between 62 dolphins (bottlenose) in a community living in 
New Zealand (Lusseau, 2003). 
HS 69 
Network of relations in a high school. The students choose 
the three members they wanted to have in a committee 
(Zeleny, 1950). 
Zachary 34 
Data collected by Wayne Zachary from the members of a 
university karate club, representing the presence or 
absence of ties among club members (Zachary, 1977). 
Sawmill 36 
A communication network within a small enterprise. All 
employees were asked to indicate the frequency with 
which they discussed work matters with each of their 
colleagues on a five-point scale ranging from less than 
once a week to several times a day (Michael and Massey, 
1997; de Nooy et al., 2005). 
High Tech 33 
A small high-tech computer firm that sells, installs, and 
maintains computer systems. The network contains the 
friendship ties among the employees (Krackhardt, 1999; 
de Nooy et al., 2005). 
Galesburg 31 
From the Columbia University Drug Study. The diffusion 
of a new drug (gammanym) was investigated and the 
friendship ties among 31 physicians were coded (Coleman 
et al., 1966; Knoke and Burt, 1983; de Nooy et al., 2005). 
Corporate 1586 
American corporate elite, formed by directors of the 625 
largest corporations, that reported the compositions of 
their boards, selected from the Fortune 1,000 in 1999 
(Davis et al., 2003). 
Drugs 616 
Social network of injecting drug users (IDUs) who shared 
a needle in the last six months (Moody, 2001). 
Colorado Springs 324 
The risk network of persons with HIV during its early 
epidemic phase in Colorado Springs, U.S., selected 
through analysis of community-wide HIV/AIDS contact 
tracing records during 1985–1999 (Potterat et al., 2002). 
Math Method 30 This network concerns the diffusion of a new mathematics 
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method in the 1950s. It traces the diffusion of the modern 
mathematical method among school systems that combine 
elementary and secondary programs in Allegheny County 
(Pennsylvania, U.S.) (de Nooy et al., 2004). 
Social3 32 
Network of social contacts among college students 
participating in a leadership course. The students choose 
the three members they wished to include in a committee 
(Zeleny, 1950). 
BF23, BF70, BF71 
40, 
48, 
49 
Networks of friendship ties from the communities 
identified as 23, 70, and 71 from the Brazilian Farmers 
longitudinal study on the adoption of a new corn seed 
(Valente, 2012; Herzog et al., 1968). 
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a 
 
 
b 
Supplementary Figure S1 | Influence of PP on emergence of leaders by selecting 
them among the nodes with high, medium or low degree centrality. The HighTech (a) 
and the network of social dates (social3) (b). 
 
High
Medium
Low
0
-2.0
-1.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Deg
ree
 Ce
ntra
lity
Exponent
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 c
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
 t
im
e
High
Medium
Low
0
-2.0
-1.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Deg
ree
 Ce
ntra
lity
Exponent
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 c
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
 t
im
e
  
29 
 
  
  
  
10
0
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
  
30 
 
  
  
  
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
cdf
  
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S2 | Cumulative degree distribution of the 15 social networks 
studied. BF23, BF70, BF71, ColoSpg, Corporate, Dolphins, Drugs, Galesburg, 
HighTech, HS, MathMethod, Prison, SawMill, Social3, Zackary. 
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Supplementary Figure S3 | Leaders with divergence. Distribution of a leader’s 
positions (blue points) around the average consensus value of the system (red point), 
which represents the centroid of the convex hull spanned by the leaders. 
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Supplementary Figure S4 | Consensus for the Sawmill network. Consensus with 
divergences (rows from top to bottom): 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5, without PP (left column) 
and with PP (right column). The continuous lines indicate the states of the followers and 
the discontinuous lines indicate the states of the leaders during the consensus process. 
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Supplementary Figure S5 | Diffusion curves for empirical social networks. The 
Mathematical Method (top left) and Brazilian Farmers Communities 23 (top right), 70 
(bottom left), and 71(bottom right). The stars represent the empirical values of the 
cumulative number of adopters. The red lines represent diffusion without PP, the blue 
lines represent the diffusion process with moderate PP, and the green lines represent 
diffusion with strong PP. 
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Supplementary Table S1 
Comparison of time for consensus for the Sawmill network with different values of 
divergence and the effect on time to reach consensus. 
 
Divergence Average Time for Consensus % Increase in Time for Consensus 
0 1,026.80 - 
0.1 1,162.18 13.18 
0.2 1,372.40 33.65 
0.5 1,850.72 80.24 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S2 
Normalized consensus time for the Sawmill network with no divergence in leaders’ 
positions with respect to the system’s average consensus value. All leaders’ initial states 
were equal to the average consensus, i.e., the average of followers’ initial states. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.22 0.15 0.88 0.72 0.49 0.20 0.06 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.80 0.21 0.14 0.73 0.62 0.43 0.19 0.05 
CC 0.84 0.21 0.14 0.77 0.65 0.45 0.19 0.05 
DC 0.83 0.21 0.14 0.76 0.64 0.45 0.19 0.06 
EC 0.96 0.23 0.15 0.87 0.73 0.50 0.20 0.06 
SC 0.89 0.23 0.14 0.85 0.69 0.46 0.20 0.06 
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Supplementary Table S3 
Normalized consensus time for the Sawmill network with divergence of 0.1 in leaders’ 
positions with respect to the system’s average consensus value, i.e., the length of the 
circumradius of the regular polygon spanned by the leaders is equal to 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.24 0.17 0.88 0.68 0.45 0.20 0.07 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.72 0.19 0.13 0.65 0.54 0.38 0.17 0.05 
CC 0.75 0.19 0.12 0.70 0.56 0.40 0.17 0.05 
DC 0.74 0.19 0.12 0.71 0.59 0.40 0.17 0.05 
EC 0.99 0.22 0.15 0.92 0.68 0.45 0.18 0.05 
SC 0.82 0.20 0.13 0.76 0.62 0.41 0.18 0.05 
 
 
Supplementary Table S4 
Normalized consensus time for the Sawmill network with divergence of 0.2 in leaders’ 
positions with respect to the system’s average consensus value, i.e., the length of the 
circumradius of the regular polygon spanned by the leaders is equal to 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.96 0.23 0.16 0.87 0.66 0.43 0.19 0.06 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.63 0.17 0.12 0.59 0.46 0.33 0.14 0.05 
CC 0.66 0.16 0.12 0.58 0.49 0.33 0.14 0.04 
DC 0.64 0.15 0.10 0.60 0.48 0.33 0.14 0.04 
EC 1.00 0.19 0.13 0.85 0.63 0.37 0.15 0.05 
SC 0.75 0.17 0.12 0.65 0.51 0.35 0.14 0.04 
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Supplementary Table S5 
Normalized consensus time for the Sawmill network with divergence of 0.5 in leaders’ 
positions with respect to the system’s average consensus value, i.e., the length of the 
circumradius of the regular polygon spanned by the leaders is equal to 0.5. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.23 0.16 0.87 0.67 0.40 0.17 0.06 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.59 0.15 0.11 0.53 0.43 0.27 0.11 0.04 
CC 0.60 0.14 0.11 0.52 0.41 0.27 0.11 0.04 
DC 0.60 0.12 0.08 0.54 0.43 0.27 0.10 0.03 
EC 0.99 0.17 0.12 0.83 0.59 0.35 0.13 0.04 
SC 0.72 0.14 0.10 0.60 0.47 0.29 0.11 0.04 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S6  
Normalized consensus times for a random graph with 10 communities (10 leaders) with 
and without PP. Leaders emerged according to their global centrality values. 
  
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.15 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.003 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.003 
CC 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.002 
DC 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.003 
EC 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.62 0.27 0.16 0.03 0.003 
SC 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.004 
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Supplementary Table S7  
Normalized consensus times for a graph with 10 communities (10 leaders) with and 
without PP. Leaders emerged according to their centrality values by community. 
 
 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.06 0.04 0.77 0.41 0.27 0.08 0.02 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=2 α=1.5 β=2 β=1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.54 0.07 0.04 0.42 0.28 0.17 0.06 0.02 
CC 0.40 0.07 0.04 0.31 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.02 
DC 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.02 
EC 0.43 0.07 0.04 0.34 0.25 0.15 0.06 0.02 
SC 0.29 0.07 0.04 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.02 
 
 
Supplementary Table S8 
Cumulative average nodes in agreement for the Math Method network with and without 
PP and empirical values. 
 
Periods 
Adopters  
(Empirical) 
Avg. Adopters 
(Simulation) 
No LR α=-4 α=-5 
1 1 1.1 1.3 1.1 
2 5 2.7 9.0 4.7 
3 14 7.7 25.6 13.7 
4 26 23.6 29.8 27.8 
5 29 28.3 30 29.4 
6 30 30 30 30 
 
  
40 
 
Supplementary Table S9  
Cumulative average nodes in agreement for the Brazilian Farmers, Community 23 
network with and without PP and empirical values. 
 
Periods 
Adopters  
(Empirical) 
Avg. Adopters 
(Simulation) 
No PP α=-4 α=-5.9 
1 1 0.8 1.0 0.8 
2 1 1.3 1.8 1.2 
3 1 1.2 2.0 1.1 
4 1 1.5 3.0 1.5 
5 3 1.8 7.2 1.7 
6 3 2.0 15.8 2.2 
7 3 2.3 23.4 2.4 
8 4 2.5 26.0 4.1 
9 4 4.0 32.3 9.0 
10 6 5.6 35.9 10.9 
11 6 7.2 37.2 11.5 
12 11 8.9 38.5 12.5 
13 13 9.5 38.9 13.5 
14 15 10.3 38.9 15.8 
15 19 12.3 38.9 17.3 
16 23 13.4 38.9 19.8 
17 33 19.0 38.9 24.6 
18 33 24.9 38.9 26.9 
19 37 26.4 38.9 30.4 
20 38 27.1 38.9 32.9 
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Supplementary Table S10  
Cumulative average nodes in agreement for the Brazilian Farmers, Community 70 
network with and without PP and empirical values. 
 
 
Periods 
Adopters  
(Empirical) 
Avg. Adopters 
(Simulation) 
No PP α=-4 α =-5.6 
1 0 0.9 0.8 0.7 
2 0 1.7 3.2 1.8 
3 0 1.8 9.5 3.0 
4 0 3.3 14.3 4.5 
5 14 4.9 23.4 5.6 
6 14 4.7 36.2 8.6 
7 15 5.8 45.4 13.7 
8 18 6.4 47.7 16.5 
9 20 6.6 47.8 18.9 
10 28 8.3 47.8 21.0 
11 29 10.2 47.8 23.5 
12 31 11.8 47.8 25.9 
13 31 14.0 47.8 28.4 
14 36 16.5 47.8 30.7 
15 38 19.1 47.8 33.1 
16 42 22.7 47.8 37.8 
17 44 27.3 47.8 42.1 
18 44 31.7 47.8 45.6 
19 45 35.4 47.8 47.4 
20 46 39.0 47.8 47.5 
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Supplementary Table S11  
Cumulative average nodes in agreement for the Brazilian Farmers, Community 71 
network with and without PP and empirical values. 
 
 
Periods 
Adopters  
(Empirical) 
Avg. Adopters 
(Simulation) 
No PP α=-4 α=-6.6 
1 0 0.5 0.7 0.7 
2 1 0.9 1.9 1.1 
3 1 1.2 4.0 1.4 
4 1 1.1 7.3 1.6 
5 5 1.0 11.8 3.2 
6 5 1.2 21.6 5.5 
7 5 2.1 32.2 6.4 
8 5 2.9 37.3 6.6 
9 5 3.6 46.0 7.0 
10 11 4.6 47.8 7.9 
11 11 6.1 48.4 9.6 
12 22 8.5 48.4 12.7 
13 24 11.7 48.4 17.3 
14 27 16.4 48.4 23.8 
15 30 21.9 48.4 31.5 
16 34 26.6 48.4 38.2 
17 37 30.8 48.4 43.1 
18 39 36.2 48.4 45.9 
19 39 40.8 48.4 47.4 
20 48 44.5 48.4 47.6 
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Supplementary Table S12  
Normalized consensus times for the BA random graph with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 
No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.44 0.31 0.75 0.67 0.84 0.38 0.13 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 
No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.89 0.33 0.26 0.73 0.61 0.41 0.23 0.09 
CC 0.91 0.34 0.27 0.78 0.65 0.42 0.22 0.08 
DC 0.89 0.33 0.26 0.75 0.62 0.41 0.23 0.09 
EC 0.93 0.34 0.27 0.77 0.64 0.42 0.22 0.08 
SC 0.90 0.34 0.27 0.76 0.63 0.41 0.22 0.08 
 
 
Supplementary Table S13  
Normalized consensus times for the ER random graph with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.34 0.23 0.90 0.75 0.61 0.31 0.10 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.81 0.10 0.06 0.67 0.47 0.28 0.10 0.05 
CC 0.81 0.10 0.06 0.67 0.46 0.27 0.09 0.02 
DC 0.81 0.10 0.06 0.69 0.48 0.28 0.10 0.03 
EC 0.82 0.13 0.08 0.69 0.48 0.30 0.11 0.03 
SC 0.82 0.13 0.08 0.68 0.48 0.31 0.11 0.02 
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Supplementary Table S14  
Normalized consensus times for the Corporate network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.36 0.22 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.37 0.11 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.67 0.02 0.01 0.52 0.35 0.27 0.08 0.01 
CC 0.70 0.03 0.01 0.54 0.35 0.28 0.09 0.01 
DC 0.69 0.05 0.04 0.52 0.36 0.29 0.10 0.02 
EC 0.67 0.02 0.01 0.52 0.36 0.27 0.08 0.01 
SC 0.68 0.02 0.01 0.51 0.35 0.27 0.08 0.01 
 
Supplementary Table S15  
Normalized consensus times for the Drugs network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.17 0.12 0.89 0.64 0.53 0.24 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.97 0.07 0.04 0.79 0.51 0.40 0.12 0.02 
CC 0.79 0.08 0.05 0.73 0.50 0.40 0.12 0.02 
DC 0.77 0.04 0.06 0.66 0.45 0.36 0.13 0.06 
EC 0.80 0.11 0.08 0.71 0.53 0.43 0.13 0.04 
SC 0.80 0.11 0.08 0.72 0.50 0.42 0.13 0.04 
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Supplementary Table S16 
Normalized consensus times for the Prison network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.26 0.19 0.93 0.70 0.49 0.23 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.93 0.17 0.11 0.85 0.68 0.45 0.17 0.04 
CC 0.97 0.17 0.11 0.86 0.66 0.45 0.17 0.04 
DC 0.95 0.17 0.10 0.85 0.65 0.44 0.17 0.04 
EC 0.98 0.17 0.11 0.84 0.68 0.44 0.17 0.04 
SC 0.94 0.17 0.10 0.85 0.65 0.43 0.17 0.04 
 
Supplementary Table S17 
Normalized consensus times for the Zachary network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.27 0.19 0.94 0.67 0.39 0.19 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.73 0.22 0.17 0.63 0.51 0.32 0.16 0.06 
CC 0.75 0.22 0.16 0.66 0.50 0.32 0.15 0.06 
DC 0.76 0.22 0.17 0.64 0.51 0.32 0.16 0.06 
EC 0.75 0.21 0.17 0.64 0.50 0.33 0.16 0.05 
SC 0.76 0.22 0.17 0.65 0.49 0.31 0.16 0.06 
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Supplementary Table S18  
Normalized consensus times for the Colorado Springs network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.83 0.22 0.15 0.76 0.62 0.56 0.37 0.13 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 1.00 0.11 0.07 0.87 0.69 0.53 0.25 0.04 
CC 0.90 0.07 0.03 0.82 0.53 0.27 0.27 0.04 
DC 0.89 0.13 0.09 0.82 0.65 0.50 0.24 0.06 
EC 0.85 0.13 0.06 0.75 0.62 0.47 0.22 0.04 
SC 0.95 0.17 0.12 0.86 0.69 0.54 0.28 0.07 
 
 
Supplementary Table S19  
Normalized consensus times for the Dolphins network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.82 0.25 0.16 0.76 0.61 0.38 0.20 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.77 0.17 0.11 0.70 0.56 0.37 0.15 0.06 
CC 0.92 0.17 0.12 0.65 0.64 0.43 0.18 0.05 
DC 0.72 0.18 0.12 0.64 0.57 0.39 0.17 0.06 
EC 0.96 0.21 0.14 0.99 0.79 0.52 0.21 0.06 
SC 1.00 0.22 0.14 0.97 0.77 0.54 0.21 0.06 
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Supplementary Table S20  
Normalized consensus times for the Galesburg network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.83 0.23 0.16 0.71 0.59 0.39 0.17 0.06 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.81 0.21 0.14 0.73 0.59 0.37 0.16 0.05 
CC 0.98 0.24 0.16 0.87 0.66 0.40 0.16 0.05 
DC 0.98 0.23 0.16 0.84 0.64 0.41 0.17 0.05 
EC 1.00 0.23 0.17 0.86 0.65 0.41 0.17 0.06 
SC 1.00 0.24 0.17 0.87 0.68 0.41 0.17 0.06 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S21  
Normalized consensus times for the HS network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.75 0.20 0.16 0.69 0.51 0.35 0.18 0.07 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.65 0.18 0.14 0.56 0.43 0.28 0.15 0.06 
CC 0.99 0.20 0.13 0.81 0.60 0.35 0.14 0.06 
DC 0.69 0.17 0.11 0.59 0.46 0.27 0.13 0.07 
EC 0.99 0.21 0.15 0.81 0.57 0.34 0.14 0.04 
SC 1.00 0.21 0.15 0.78 0.59 0.34 0.14 0.04 
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Supplementary Table S22 
Normalized consensus times for the High Tech network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.93 0.25 0.19 0.83 0.67 0.41 0.18 0.07 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.78 0.22 0.16 0.70 0.56 0.37 0.16 0.06 
CC 0.97 0.24 0.17 0.84 0.66 0.41 0.18 0.06 
DC 0.93 0.24 0.18 0.83 0.67 0.40 0.18 0.06 
EC 0.98 0.25 0.19 0.88 0.68 0.42 0.19 0.07 
SC 1.00 0.27 0.19 0.88 0.68 0.44 0.19 0.06 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S23  
Normalized consensus times for the Math Method network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.87 0.26 0.19 0.77 0.61 0.41 0.19 0.07 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.63 0.22 0.16 0.59 0.50 0.35 0.17 0.06 
CC 1.00 0.26 0.19 0.87 0.71 0.47 0.19 0.07 
DC 0.98 0.26 0.18 0.86 0.70 0.46 0.19 0.07 
EC 0.96 0.27 0.18 0.90 0.74 0.45 0.20 0.07 
SC 1.00 0.26 0.19 0.86 0.71 0.44 0.20 0.07 
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Supplementary Table S24  
Normalized consensus times for the Sawmill network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.24 0.17 0.88 0.68 0.45 0.20 0.07 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.72 0.19 0.13 0.65 0.54 0.38 0.17 0.05 
CC 0.75 0.19 0.12 0.70 0.56 0.40 0.17 0.05 
DC 0.74 0.19 0.12 0.71 0.59 0.40 0.17 0.05 
EC 0.99 0.22 0.15 0.92 0.68 0.45 0.18 0.05 
SC 0.82 0.20 0.13 0.76 0.62 0.41 0.18 0.05 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S25  
Normalized consensus times for the Social3 network with divergence of 0.1. 
 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.92 0.33 0.24 0.81 0.67 0.46 0.24 0.11 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.92 0.31 0.24 0.79 0.68 0.42 0.21 0.07 
CC 0.98 0.32 0.23 0.84 0.70 0.45 0.22 0.08 
DC 1.00 0.33 0.25 0.87 0.70 0.45 0.23 0.08 
EC 0.96 0.32 0.24 0.88 0.74 0.46 0.23 0.08 
SC 0.92 0.32 0.25 0.86 0.69 0.46 0.22 0.09 
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Supplementary Table S26  
Normalized consensus times for the BA random graph with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.42 0.29 0.94 0.85 0.79 0.33 0.11 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.69 0.28 0.22 0.60 0.51 0.34 0.18 0.08 
CC 0.74 0.29 0.22 0.64 0.54 0.35 0.18 0.08 
DC 0.70 0.28 0.22 0.60 0.50 0.33 0.19 0.08 
EC 0.72 0.28 0.23 0.63 0.53 0.34 0.18 0.07 
SC 0.71 0.28 0.22 0.62 0.53 0.34 0.18 0.08 
 
 
Supplementary Table S27  
Normalized consensus times for the ER random graph with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.27 0.18 0.88 0.70 0.45 0.20 0.07 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.67 0.21 0.16 0.57 0.46 0.33 0.18 0.07 
CC 0.78 0.22 0.14 0.67 0.54 0.32 0.14 0.03 
DC 0.70 0.22 0.18 0.58 0.45 0.36 0.20 0.08 
EC 0.74 0.20 0.14 0.63 0.50 0.32 0.15 0.05 
SC 0.75 0.23 0.17 0.64 0.51 0.36 0.18 0.07 
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Supplementary Table S28  
Normalized consensus times for the Corporate network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.19 0.11 0.78 0.64 0.45 0.17 0.04 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.002 
CC 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.002 
DC 0.24 0.04 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.007 
EC 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.002 
SC 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.002 
 
 
Supplementary Table S29  
Normalized consensus times for the Drugs network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.15 0.09 0.76 0.45 0.44 0.19 0.05 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.69 0.06 0.04 0.52 0.34 0.25 0.06 0.02 
CC 0.47 0.07 0.05 0.44 0.30 0.23 0.07 0.01 
DC 0.46 0.04 0.05 0.37 0.24 0.20 0.08 0.04 
EC 0.51 0.08 0.06 0.42 0.31 0.21 0.08 0.03 
SC 0.51 0.08 0.06 0.40 0.32 0.21 0.08 0.03 
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Supplementary Table S30  
Normalized consensus times for the Prison network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.29 0.20 0.91 0.73 0.50 0.24 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.81 0.15 0.10 0.74 0.56 0.38 0.15 0.03 
CC 0.83 0.15 0.09 0.73 0.57 0.39 0.15 0.04 
DC 0.82 0.15 0.09 0.83 0.55 0.39 0.14 0.05 
EC 0.90 0.15 0.10 0.79 0.58 0.39 0.15 0.03 
SC 0.85 0.15 0.09 0.74 0.56 0.39 0.14 0.05 
 
 
Supplementary Table S31  
Normalized consensus times for the Zachary network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
1.00 0.27 0.21 0.83 0.64 0.40 0.19 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.72 0.23 0.18 0.62 0.49 0.30 0.14 0.07 
CC 0.72 0.23 0.18 0.61 0.48 0.30 0.14 0.06 
DC 0.72 0.22 0.17 0.60 0.47 0.29 0.16 0.06 
EC 0.70 0.22 0.17 0.59 0.48 0.31 0.15 0.05 
SC 0.73 0.22 0.18 0.59 0.48 0.29 0.15 0.06 
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Supplementary Table S32  
Normalized consensus times for the Colorado Springs network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.70 0.27 0.16 0.63 0.57 0.64 0.40 0.11 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 1.00 0.11 0.07 0.86 0.63 0.50 0.20 0.04 
CC 0.84 0.07 0.04 0.74 0.58 0.49 0.21 0.03 
DC 0.81 0.13 0.09 0.73 0.56 0.43 0.20 0.05 
EC 0.71 0.17 0.09 0.62 0.46 0.34 0.16 0.03 
SC 0.91 0.17 0.11 0.85 0.64 0.49 0.24 0.06 
 
 
Supplementary Table S33  
Normalized consensus times for the Dolphins network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.84 0.24 0.18 0.76 0.59 0.41 0.19 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.72 0.16 0.11 0.65 0.52 0.32 0.14 0.06 
CC 0.92 0.16 0.10 0.82 0.60 0.40 0.14 0.05 
DC 0.67 0.15 0.10 0.63 0.50 0.34 0.14 0.06 
EC 0.94 0.19 0.12 0.84 0.63 0.41 0.17 0.05 
SC 1.00 0.18 0.12 0.84 0.65 0.45 0.17 0.06 
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Supplementary Table S34 
Normalized consensus times for the Galesburg network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.81 0.24 0.18 0.71 0.56 0.38 0.18 0.07 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.80 0.20 0.15 0.70 0.56 0.36 0.15 0.06 
CC 0.93 0.22 0.16 0.83 0.62 0.39 0.16 0.05 
DC 0.94 0.22 0.16 0.83 0.64 0.39 0.16 0.06 
EC 0.97 0.23 0.18 0.85 0.65 0.41 0.16 0.06 
SC 1.00 0.24 0.17 0.84 0.64 0.40 0.17 0.06 
 
 
Supplementary Table S35  
Normalized consensus times for the HS network with divergence of 0.2 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.76 0.23 0.17 0.65 0.51 0.37 0.20 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.60 0.20 0.16 0.51 0.39 0.27 0.16 0.07 
CC 0.99 0.21 0.16 0.83 0.60 0.34 0.15 0.06 
DC 0.66 0.14 0.11 0.53 0.43 0.25 0.13 0.07 
EC 0.99 0.23 0.17 0.82 0.62 0.35 0.15 0.05 
SC 1.00 0.24 0.17 0.81 0.60 0.34 0.15 0.05 
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Supplementary Table S36 
Normalized consensus times for the High Tech network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.93 0.28 0.22 0.81 0.65 0.42 0.20 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.76 0.22 0.17 0.69 0.56 0.35 0.16 0.06 
CC 0.94 0.25 0.18 0.81 0.64 0.40 0.17 0.05 
DC 0.95 0.24 0.19 0.82 0.66 0.40 0.17 0.07 
EC 0.97 0.27 0.20 0.84 0.67 0.41 0.18 0.07 
SC 1.00 0.27 0.20 0.86 0.69 0.42 0.18 0.06 
 
 
Supplementary Table S37 
Normalized consensus times for the Math Method network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.79 0.25 0.19 0.76 0.62 0.43 0.20 0.08 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.60 0.23 0.18 0.56 0.49 0.32 0.16 0.06 
CC 1.00 0.26 0.18 0.90 0.68 0.43 0.19 0.07 
DC 0.98 0.25 0.18 0.87 0.69 0.42 0.19 0.07 
EC 0.96 0.25 0.18 0.85 0.71 0.42 0.20 0.06 
SC 0.93 0.25 0.18 0.85 0.70 0.43 0.19 0.06 
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Supplementary Table S38  
Normalized consensus times for the Sawmill network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.96 0.23 0.16 0.87 0.66 0.43 0.19 0.06 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.63 0.17 0.12 0.59 0.46 0.33 0.14 0.05 
CC 0.66 0.16 0.12 0.58 0.49 0.33 0.14 0.04 
DC 0.64 0.15 0.10 0.60 0.48 0.33 0.14 0.04 
EC 1.00 0.19 0.13 0.85 0.63 0.37 0.15 0.05 
SC 0.75 0.17 0.12 0.65 0.51 0.35 0.14 0.04 
 
 
Supplementary Table S39 
Normalized consensus times for the Social3 network with divergence of 0.2. 
 
 
Random Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
 
α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
 
0.94 0.37 0.29 0.83 0.71 0.50 0.28 0.13 
 
Leader-Centrality Emergence 
 No PP 
PL-decay Exp-decay Social 
Centrality α=-2 α=-1.5 β=-2 β=-1.5 δ=0.1 δ=0.25 δ=0.5 
BC 0.90 0.35 0.27 0.83 0.70 0.43 0.23 0.08 
CC 0.97 0.34 0.27 0.87 0.73 0.45 0.22 0.09 
DC 0.90 0.36 0.27 0.87 0.72 0.45 0.22 0.08 
EC 1.00 0.31 0.25 0.87 0.73 0.44 0.23 0.09 
SC 0.94 0.33 0.24 0.83 0.70 0.44 0.21 0.11 
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